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Abstract Impulsivity is characterized in part by height-
ened sensitivity to immediate relative to future rewards.
Although previous research has suggested that “high
discounters” in intertemporal choice tasks tend to prefer
immediate over future rewards because they devalue the
latter, it remains possible that they instead overvalue
immediate rewards. To investigate this question, we
recorded the reward positivity, a component of the
event-related brain potential (ERP) associated with re-
ward processing, with participants engaged in a task in
which they received both immediate and future rewards
and nonrewards. The participants also completed a tem-
poral discounting task without ERP recording. We found
that immediate but not future rewards elicited the re-
ward positivity. High discounters also produced larger
reward positivities to immediate rewards than did low
discounters, indicating that high discounters relatively
overvalued immediate rewards. These findings suggest
that high discounters may be more motivated than low
discounters to work for monetary rewards, irrespective
of the time of arrival of the incentives.
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All other things being equal, most people would rather have
a good thing right away instead of waiting for it. The degree
to which people and other animals prefer immediate
over future rewards is called temporal discounting
(Ainslie, 1975). People generally discount future rewards
hyperbolically rather than at a constant rate (Green &
Myerson, 2004; Mazur, 1987), such that we discount
rewards more in the near future and less in the far future,
but considerable variability exists in degrees of discounting
across individuals (Chabris, Laibson, & Schuldt, 2008). For
example, in the delay discounting task (DDT; Rachlin,
Raineri, & Cross, 1991), participants make successive
choices between receiving an immediate monetary reward,
which varies across trials, versus a larger monetary reward
in the future, which remains constant across trials. In this
task, a high discounter (HD) might prefer $10 immediately
over $100 a year from now, whereas a low discounter (LD)
might prefer the opposite. According to classical economic
theory, hyperbolic discounting is irrational because it gives
rise to preference reversal—for example, preferring $100
today over $101 tomorrow, while simultaneously preferring
$101 in a year and a day over $100 in a year (Frederick,
Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). In extreme cases,
steeper discount rates are associated with pathological
conditions that may involve impulsive behaviors, such as
substance abuse (Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999; Oberlin &
Grahame, 2009; Perry & Carroll, 2008) and gambling
addiction (Alessi & Petry, 2003). Nevertheless, most
individuals—not just HDs—discount hyperbolically, and
thus in this sense can be said to behave irrationally.1
Brain research has provided insight into the neural pro-
cesses that underlie the discounting mechanism. These stud-
ies have implicated a neural system involving the posterior
cingulate cortex, dorsolateral and medial prefrontal cortex,
orbitofrontal cortex, parietal cortex, the ventral striatum, and
the midbrain dopamine system (Ballard & Knutson, 2009;
Kable & Glimcher, 2007; McClure, Ericson, Laibson,
Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2007; McClure, Laibson,
Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). However, researchers
1 This classical account stands in contrast with another long-standing
view, that temporal discounting is a natural consequence of evolving
personal identity (see Parfit, 1971).
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disagree about whether a single neural system (Kable &
Glimcher, 2007) or two sometimes conflicting systems
(McClure et al., 2007; McClure et al., 2004) account for
hyperbolic reward discounting. McClure et al. (2007;
McClure et al., 2004) conducted a series of fMRI
experiments in which participants performed a delay
discounting task (DDT). The researchers identified two
neural systems that were activated by the DDT:
Mesolimbic dopamine and limbic reward areas,
corresponding to a “β” system underlying impulsive
behavior, were most activated when participants chose
an immediate option, and prefrontal and parietal struc-
tures, corresponding to a “δ” system associated with
careful planning, were active for all choices. In addi-
tion, the relative activations of the β and δ systems
predicted individual choice behavior on a trial-by-trial
basis. Contrary to these findings, Kable and Glimcher
(2007) found, in a separate DDT fMRI study, that a
single neural system composed of the ventral striatum,
medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex
tracked subjective reward values at all delays, both
immediate and future.
The midbrain dopamine system plays a critical role
in reinforcement learning and decision making by cod-
ing for reward prediction errors that indicate whether an
event or outcome is better or worse than expected
(Schultz, 2002, 2004). As evidence for dopamine’s role
in hyperbolic temporal discounting, Kobayashi and
Schultz (2008) recorded the action potentials of dopa-
mine neurons in rhesus monkeys during a Pavlovian
conditioning task with rewards occurring at different
delivery delays. Conditioned stimuli associated with
longer delays elicited weaker responses from dopamine
neurons. Furthermore, the population response of dopa-
mine neurons to conditioned stimuli decreased as a
function of reward delay according to a function that
was best described by a hyperbolic curve. Consonant
with these findings, a genetics study involving human
participants suggested that individual differences in the
midbrain dopamine system may underlie idiosyncratic
discounting rates (Eisenberg et al., 2007). Specifically,
individuals with steeper discount rates were found to
have genetic polymorphisms coding for the expression
of D2 (TaqI A) and D4 (VNTR) dopamine receptors
that, according to the researchers, influence the balance
of processing between the striatal systems involved in
reward salience and the frontal systems involved in
deliberative control. Additionally, Pine, Shiner,
Seymour, and Dolan (2010) observed increased temporal
discounting in humans who were administered L-DOPA,
a dopamine precursor. Individuals showing greater dis-
count rates were also associated with diminished activity
of the nucleus accumbens—a target of the midbrain
dopamine system that plays a critical role in the hedon-
ic aspect of reward processing—to the magnitude of
future reward values (Ballard & Knutson, 2009).
Temporal discounting research has been predominantly
concerned with individual differences in the relative valu-
ations of potential future versus immediate rewards. In fact,
the classic delay discount function (Mazur, 1987) does not
provide a measure of the absolute, subjective value of the
reward. Rather, the immediate reward serves as the refer-
ence point for all future rewards. Although rarely discussed
explicitly, this research often assumes that individual differ-
ences in discounting are driven by variability in the valua-
tion of future rewards (e.g., Kirby et al., 1999; but see
Takahishi, 2009). One exception is a study by Hariri et al.
(2006), who found that HDs, in comparison to LDs,
exhibited greater overall ventral striatal activity to pos-
itive and negative feedback stimuli related to immediate
rewards, and greater differential ventral striatal activity
for rewards as compared to nonrewards. These results
suggest that idiosyncratic discount rates are determined
by the subjective valuation of immediate rewards as
well as of future rewards. Individual differences in
discount rates as inferred from the DDT thus confound
differences in baseline levels of reward valuation with
differences in the valuation of immediate versus future
rewards; it remains unclear whether impulsive individu-
als undervalue future rewards, as is normally assumed,
or instead overvalue immediate rewards.
Here, we investigated this question using the event-
related brain potential (ERP) technique. We utilized the
reward positivity, alternatively referred to as the feedback
error-related negativity, an ERP component associated with
reward processing (Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Krigolson,
2008; for a review, see Walsh & Anderson, 2012). The
reward positivity is hypothesized to reflect the impact of
dopamine-dependent reinforcement learning signals on the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) for the purpose of adaptive
decision making (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), and it has
been proposed that the ACC uses this information to
learn the value of extended sequences of behaviors and
tasks (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). EEG was recorded
from participants as they navigated a virtual T-maze to
find rewards (Baker & Holroyd, 2009). Each reward
was either large (25 cents Canadian) or small (1 cent
Canadian) and was delivered either at the end of the
session or after 6 months. Participants also completed
the DDT without EEG recording. We predicted that the
reward positivity associated with immediate large and
small rewards would be larger than the reward positivity
associated with future large and small rewards.
Furthermore, we predicted that the amplitude of the
reward positivity would reflect individual differences in
temporal discounting, as revealed by the DDT scores.
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Method
Participants
A group of 40 participants (22 female, 18 male; 20.0 ±
3.6 years of age) were recruited through the University of
Victoria Psychology subject pool and were granted class
credit for their participation. In addition, they were paid a
small monetary bonus ($15–$20) for their task performance
at the end of the session, as well as an additional perfor-
mance bonus ($15–$20) mailed by check to their home
address 6 months after the session (see below). All of the
participants provided written, informed consent. The study
was conducted in accordance with the ethical standards
prescribed in the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved
by the human participants review board at the University of
Victoria.
Apparatus and procedure
The participants were seated comfortably in front of a com-
puter monitor in an electromagnetically shielded booth and
performed both a maze task and a DDT, the order of which
was counterbalanced across participants. EEG data were
collected only during the maze task.
DDT
The DDT was modeled after that of Eisenberg et al. (2007)
and Rachlin et al. (1991) using MATLAB (The Mathworks,
Natick, MA). Each participant was presented with a series of
choices between two hypothetical amounts of money, one
consisting of $100 available sometime in the future, and the
other equal to or less than $100 available immediately. The
delay interval and the amount of the immediate payoff were
varied systematically across choices. The delay periods
ranged across 11 values, from 1 week to 25 years: 1 week,
2 weeks, 2 months, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 5 years,
10 years, 15 years, 20 years, and 25 years. The immediate
monetary rewards ranged from $0.10 to $100 Canadian,
with 29 possible amounts (see Eisenberg et al., 2007, for
the details). For example, a typical question was “Would
you prefer $45 today or $100 in 5 years?” The questions
were first presented with descending amounts of the imme-
diate reward (from $100 downward) and ascending time
intervals. For a given delay, participants were asked a series
of questions with descending (or ascending) rewards until
they reached the indifference point; then, the question list
was reset with a longer time interval. Typically, participants
chose the future amount over the immediate amount for
several questions in succession and then switched
responses, indicating that for that option they preferred the
immediate amount over the future amount; this value was
taken as the indifference point for the associated time inter-
val. If the participant maintained a choice for five more
successive monetary intervals, the program switched to the
next time interval. After completion of the maximum (25-
year) interval trial, the program began the questions again
starting at 1 week, at five monetary choices below that
participant’s previously determined indifference point for
that delay. This set of questions progressed with an ascend-
ing immediate monetary amount until a second indifference
point was reached, when the participant switched from
choosing the future amount over the immediate amount to
choosing the immediate amount over the future amount, and
this behavior was sustained for five questions. The total
number of questions thus depended on the participant’s
performance. The overall indifference points for each time
interval were determined for each participant by averaging
the two indifference points, ascending and descending.
Mazur’s (1987) hyperbolic equation was fit to the choice
behavior data to determine the individual discounting pa-
rameter k, with a larger k indicating steeper discounting—
that is, relative preference for smaller immediate rewards
over larger future ones. The data of four participants (one
male, three female) were excluded from the analysis because
inspection of their DDT choice behavior revealed highly
erratic task performance. A logarithmic transformation was
applied to the discount rate (k) so as to correct for an
extreme positive skew, as is common practice for DDT data
analysis (Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001), and
any statistical analysis on discount rate used the transformed
data (log k + 1).
T-maze
Participants were asked to explore a virtual “T-Maze” coded
in E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools Inc., Sharpsburg,
PA) to find rewards at the ends of the arms (Baker &
Holroyd, 2009). The maze consisted of a straight corridor
with two arms at a 90º angle to the main corridor, resulting
in a “T”. The participants began each trial at the stem of the
T and were prompted with a green double arrow to choose a
direction: left or right. They pressed either a left or a right
button on a button box to choose the corresponding direc-
tion. They were then shown a view down the relevant arm of
the T-maze (500 ms), followed by one of four feedback
stimuli presented against the far wall of the arm
(1,000 ms), after which the next trial began. The four feed-
back stimuli consisted of either a quarter or a penny
(Canadian), with the time of reward delivery written below:
“Today” or “6 months”. For emphasis, “Today” was written
in green and “6 months” was written in red, and the coins
were bordered with the corresponding color (Fig. 1).
Prior to beginning the task, the participants were provid-
ed with verbal and visual instructions about how to navigate
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the maze. They were also shown the four possible stimuli:
25 cents immediately, 25 cents in 6 months, 1 cent imme-
diately, and 1 cent in 6 months. They were assured that they
would earn the amount of money represented by the stimuli,
with the sum total of the immediate rewards to be delivered
following completion of the experiment, and the sum total
of the future rewards to be sent via a check from the
university 6 months later. To emphasize this point, before
the task started participants were shown a cash reward of
about $10 and a blank example check. They were asked to
respond in a way that would maximize their preferred re-
ward(s). Unbeknownst to the participants, the probability of
receiving each stimulus was in fact random (with replace-
ment) and equiprobable.
The T-Maze task consisted of 240 trials, divided into four
blocks of 60 trials each. On average, the participants were
presented with 60 trials for each of the four feedback stim-
uli. Between the blocks, participants were provided with a
self-timed rest period. The amounts of money earned for
both the immediate and future conditions were displayed at
the end of the first block. To prevent the possibility that the
participants would realize that the feedback was random, the
total amounts were not presented again until the end of the
task. The total money earned varied across participants, due
to chance. After the task, the participants completed a six-
item, 5-point Likert questionnaire in which they rated their
reward preferences and how hard they strove to find the
rewards.
Electroencephalogram (EEG) data acquisition and analysis
An EEG was recorded during the T-Maze task using an
array of 36 electrode sites placed in accordance with the
extended International 10–20 System (Jasper, 1958).
Signals were acquired using Ag/AgCl ring electrodes
mounted in a nylon electrode cap with an abrasive, conduc-
tive gel (EASYCAP GmbH, Herrsching-Breitbrunn,
Germany). Voltages were amplified by low-noise electrode
differential amplifiers with a frequency response of DC
0.017 – 67.5 Hz (90-dB/octave roll-off) and digitized at a
rate of 250 samples per second. The digitized signals were
recorded to disk using Brain Vision Recorder software
(Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany). The interelec-
trode impedances were maintained below 10 kΩ. Two elec-
trodes were also placed on the left and right mastoids, and
the EEG was recorded using the average reference. An
electroocculogram (EOG) was recorded for the purpose of
artifact correction; horizontal EOG was recorded from the
external canthi of both eyes, and vertical EOG was recorded
from the suborbit of the right eye and electrode channel Fp2.
Postprocessing and data visualization were performed
using the Brain Vision Analyzer software (Brain Products
GmbH, Munich, Germany). The digitized signals were fil-
tered using a fourth-order digital Butterworth filter with a
passband of 0.10–20 Hz. An 800-ms epoch of data, extend-
ing from 200 ms prior to 600 ms following the onset of each
feedback stimulus, was extracted from the continuous data
file for analysis. Ocular artifacts were corrected using the
eye movement correction algorithm described by Gratton,
Coles, and Donchin (1983). The EEG data were re-
referenced to the linked mastoid electrodes. The data were
baseline-corrected by subtracting from each sample the
mean voltage associated with that electrode during the
200-ms interval preceding stimulus onset. Muscular and
other artifacts were removed using a ±100-μV level thresh-
old and a ±50-μV step threshold as rejection criteria. ERPs
were then created for each electrode and participant by
averaging the single-trial EEGs according to each type of
Fig. 1 Stimuli and T-maze task. (Top left) The four possible rewards,
as seen by the participants before starting the task. (Bottom left) An
example overview of the T-maze, shown at the start of each block.
(Right) Example maze images for a single trial. The starting corridor
was shown for 1,000 ms, until a green double arrow appeared prompt-
ing the participant to choose a direction. Depending on their choices,
either the left or the right alley was displayed for 500 ms, followed by
the reward feedback for another 1,000 ms
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feedback (immediate quarter, future quarter, immediate pen-
ny, and future penny).
The reward positivity was measured at channel FCz,
where it typically reaches its maximum amplitude
(Holroyd & Krigolson, 2007; Miltner, Braun, & Coles,
1997; Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, & Coles, 2004). For
each participant the reward positivities to immediate and
future outcomes were determined by subtracting the
average ERPs elicited by large-reward feedback from
the average ERPs elicited by small-reward feedback
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Holroyd & Krigolson, 2007),
separately by condition: that is, immediate penny minus
immediate quarter, and future penny minus future quar-
ter. The peak amplitude of each difference wave was
obtained by averaging the difference wave within a 250-
to 350-ms window following feedback onset (e.g.,
Holroyd, Baker, Kerns, & Müller, 2008), in correspon-
dence with the timing of the N200 as observed in the
grand-average waveforms. Note that the difference
waves peaked outside of the window, during the period
of the P300 ERP component. Nevertheless, the
difference-wave approach minimizes possible overlap
with other ERP components (Luck, 2005); in the case
of the reward positivity, evidence of a frontocentral
scalp distribution during the time window of interest
confirmed the absence of overlap with more posteriorly




Figure 2 illustrates the grand-averaged ERPs (N 0 36)
recorded at channel FCz for each of the four stimulus
conditions, and Fig. 3 shows the immediate and future
difference waves and their associated scalp distributions
(averaged across the 250 to 350 ms time window). The
difference-wave amplitude to the immediate outcomes
was significantly different from zero (–2.37μV), t(35) 0 –
7.35, p < .001, and was maximal frontocentrally (FCz),
consistent with its identification as a reward positivity.
By contrast, the amplitude to the future outcomes was
not statistically different from zero (–0.33μV), t(35) 0 –
1.26 , p 0 .22, and was maximal over the frontal pole
(Fpz), a distribution that is not as consistent with the
reward positivity. The sizes of the two difference waves
were significantly different from each other, t(35) 0 –
6.34, p < .001. Further analyses indicated no effects
of task order, F(2, 31)0 1.87, p 0 .17, or participant
sex, F(2, 31) 0 0.51, p 0 .61, on reward positivity
amplitude.
DDT and reward positivity
The discount rate (k) ranged from a minimum of 0.000 to a
maximum of 1.166, with a median of 0.052. No sex differ-
ences were found in the transformed discount rates (log k),
t(34) 0 0.04, p 0 .97. A repeated measures analysis of
covariance with timing of reward (immediate vs. future) as
the repeated measure and transformed discount rate (log k) as
a covariate revealed no statistically significant interaction,
F(1, 34) 0 1.07, p 0 .31. There was also no significant main
effect of transformed discount rate, F(1, 34) 0 1.33, p 0 .26.
On the basis of our a priori hypothesis that HDs and LDs
would differ in reward positivity amplitude, as an exploratory
analysis we created two groups of individuals with extreme
discounting scores. The participants with discount rates in the
highest quartile (top ten HDs, including five females) were
compared to those in the lowest quartile (bottom ten LDs,
including four females). The values for k ranged from 0.134 to
1.166 for HDs and from 0.000 to 0.009 for LDs. The discount
rates of HDs (0.400) and LDs (0.004) were significantly
different from each other, t(18) 0 –4.34, p < .001 (analysis
conducted using log k). The grand-average ERPs recorded at
channel FCz for these groups and the associated difference
waves are presented in Fig. 4, with the associated scalp dis-
tributions in Fig. 5. A 2 × 2 mixed analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on reward positivity amplitude, with Reward
Timing (immediate vs. future) as a repeated factor and
Discounting Group (high vs. low) as a between-subjects
factor revealed a significant main effect of discounting
across groups (Fig. 6), showing that the HDs exhibited
larger reward positivities for both the immediate and
future rewards, relative to the LDs, F(1, 18) 0 5.37,
Fig. 2 Event-related potentials for all participants, elicited by small
(penny) and large (quarter) rewards delivered at the end of the exper-
iment (Im) and after 6 months (Fut). Stimulus presentation is at 0 ms,
and note that negative is plotted up by convention
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p 0 .03. The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of reward
timing, such that immediate rewards were associated with
larger reward positivities than future rewards (–2.37 vs. –0.33
μV), F(1, 18) 0 25.22, p < .01. However, there was no signif-
icant interaction between discounting group and reward timing,
F(1, 18) 0 1.49, p 0 .24.
Note that despite the main effect of group, the reward
positivities to the delayed outcomes across subjects were
not statistically different from zero (Fig. 3, bottom). As
an exploratory analysis, we therefore conducted a post-
hoc test that compared reward positivity amplitudes sep-
arately for the immediate and future outcomes for both
groups. Importantly, HDs produced a significantly larger
reward positivity to immediate outcomes (–3.62μV) than
the LDs did (–1.60μV), t(18) 0 2.614, p 0 .02. The scalp
distribution of the immediate difference wave was max-
imal at FCz for the HDs and at Fz for the LDs, which
was not statistically different from the amplitude at FCz,
p > .05. In addition, the reward positivities to future
outcomes were not significantly different from zero for
either group [high, t(9) 0 –1.71, p 0 .12; low, t(9) 0
0.07, p 0 .94], nor were they different from each other:
HD (–0.92 μV) and LD (0.43 μV), t(18) 0 1.24, p 0 .23.
These results suggest that the main effect of group may
have resulted primarily from the reward positivity elicited
by the immediate outcomes, and that the absence of an
interaction may have been due to insufficient statistical
power. Finally, the reward positivity amplitudes to imme-
diate and future outcomes were not significantly related
to the post-T-maze Likert questions about immediate
reward preferences [immediate, r(34) 0 –.09, p 0 .59;
future, r(34) 0 .09, p 0 .61]. However, discount rate (k)
and the immediate reward preference self-ratings were
significantly related, r(34) 0 .35, p 0 .04.
Discussion
Despite a wealth of research on the subject, temporal dis-
counting is still poorly understood. In particular, because
typical discounting tasks assess relative rather than absolute
reward values, it remains to be determined whether HDs
generally over- or undervalue rewards: HDs may relatively
undervalue future rewards, which would be consistent with
Fig. 3 Immediate (Im) quarter,
immediate penny, and the
corresponding immediate re-
ward positivity (RewP) differ-
ence wave (top left), and future
(Fut) quarter, future penny, and
the corresponding future RewP
difference wave (bottom left).
Stimulus presentation occurs at
0 ms, and negative is plotted up
by convention. Shaded areas
indicate the time range during
which the RewP was evaluated
(250–350 ms). Scalp distribu-
tions are shown for the imme-
diate RewP (top right) and the
future RewP (bottom right),
with white, red, and blue/black
corresponding to the most neg-
ative, most positive, and inter-
mediate voltages, respectively
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the common account of temporal discounting, or instead
they may relatively overvalue immediate rewards. We used
an electrophysiological measure of reward processing, the
reward positivity, to assess individual differences in reward
valuation for HDs and LDs. Our postexperiment question-
naire results indicated that participants were generally aware
of their preferences for immediate over future rewards.
Although we did not find a significant association between
overall discounting rates and either the timing of reward
delivery or reward positivity amplitude, our hypothesis
concerned differences between HDs and LDs. Therefore,
as an exploratory analysis, we categorized participants into
two groups with extreme discounting scores. Not surpris-
ingly, the results indicated that both HDs and LDs valued
immediate over future rewards, producing larger reward
positivities to the immediate as compared to the future out-
comes. We also found an overall main effect of group,
wherein HDs appeared to value both types of rewards,
immediate and future, more than LDs, as well as a lack of
interaction between group and time of reward delivery,
suggesting that even though HDs valued rewards more
overall, both groups discounted rewards at about the same
rate. On the other hand, an exploratory post-hoc analysis
indicated that whereas the reward positivity amplitude to
immediate rewards was larger for the HDs than for the LDs,
the reward positivity amplitude to future rewards was nei-
ther significantly different between the two groups nor dif-
ferent from zero. These results suggest that the main effect
of group may have resulted primarily from the reward
positivity elicited by the immediate outcomes and that the
Fig. 4 Event-related potentials and difference waves for the high
discounters (top) and low discounters (bottom). Stimulus presentation
occurs at 0 ms, and negative is plotted up by convention. Shaded areas
indicate the time range in which the reward positivity (RewP) was
evaluated (250–350 ms). Im, immediate outcomes; Fut, future
outcomes
Fig. 5 Scalp distributions of the reward positivity. (Top left) Immedi-
ate outcomes for high discounters (HDs). (Top right) HDs’ future
outcomes. (Bottom left) Immediate outcomes for low discounters
(LDs). (Bottom right) LDs’ future outcomes. White, red, and blue/
black correspond to the most negative, most positive, and intermediate
voltages, respectively
Fig. 6 Reward positivity (RewP) amplitudes elicited by immediate
and future outcomes for high and low discounters. Error bars indicate
the within-group standard errors
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absence of an interaction may have been due to insufficient
statistical power, a question that remains for future research.
These results are highly suggestive: It is often assumed in
temporal-discounting research that HDs care less about fu-
ture rewards than LDs do, but our results suggest that HDs,
in fact, value rewards relatively more, despite behavioral
evidence of greater temporal discounting. Possibly, the rel-
atively deep discounting of future rewards by HDs is com-
pensated by their overvaluation of immediate rewards, such
that HDs place more value on both immediate and future
rewards. An alternative possibility is that HDs and LDs
actually share the same discounting rates, but that the dif-
ference in preference observed in their behavior arises from
the difference in how they value the immediate reward (i.e.,
a lateral shift of the discounting curve).
Also interesting is the apparent absence of a reward posi-
tivity for future but not for immediate rewards (Fig. 3). These
observations are consistent with those of previous studies that
have indicated that the reward-processing system underlying
the reward positivity classifies outcomes in a binary manner
(Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006; Holroyd, Hajcak,
& Larsen, 2006). Specifically, the system that produces the
reward positivity appears to fixate on a goal, the unexpected
attainment of which elicits the reward positivity, whereas any
other outcome elicits the default response to unexpected task-
relevant events—namely, the N200 ERP component
(Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008; see also Baker
& Holroyd, 2011; Warren & Holroyd, 2012). In the present
case, reward positivity amplitude was also all or none: It was
large in the immediate condition, and absent in the future
condition. Thus, the immediate quarter feedback appeared to
serve as the goal state of the system, eliciting the reward
positivity, such that all of the other outcomes indicated a
failure to achieve the goal state, eliciting the N200. In other
words, participants evidently placed no value on the immedi-
ate penny, delayed penny, and delayed quarter outcomes, and
thus none of these events produced a reward positivity.
Support for this interpretation is provided by inspection of
Fig. 2, which highlights differences in the raw ERPs elicited
by the immediate-quarter feedback and the other three ERPs.
Understood in this context, it appears that both groups fixated
on the immediate reward, such that the reward positivity was
elicited in an all-or-none manner, but that a larger reward
positivity was elicited to the immediate reward by HDs than
by LDs, because the former group valued this outcome rela-
tively more. Nevertheless, the main effect of group suggests
that, even though the future-reward positivity was not statis-
tically measurable on its own, the HDs may also value the
future rewards more than the LDs, a question that should also
be explored in future investigations.
Note that the raw ERPs are difficult to interpret in this
study design because of potential overlap of the reward
positivity with the ERP components elicited by other
neurocognitive processes (such as the P300; Luck, 2005).
The difference-wave approach minimizes this danger by
isolating the ERP variance of interest (due to reward and
error processing) from other ERP components, as is dem-
onstrated by the frontocentral scalp distribution of the dif-
ference (Holroyd & Krigolson, 2007). Because reward and
error processing are combined within the same measure, the
method does not indicate which of these two factors the
effects primarily result from (relative to a neutral condition).
Nevertheless, numerous studies over the past 5 years have
indicated that the variance in ERPs between correct and
error trials is due primarily to processing on correct rather
than on error trials (Baker & Holroyd, 2011; Baker,
Stockwell, Barnes, & Holroyd, 2011; Cohen, Elger, &
Ranganath, 2007; Eppinger, Kray, Mock, & Mecklinger,
2008; Foti, Weinberg, Dien, & Hajcak, 2011; Hewig et al.,
2010; Holroyd, Krigolson, & Lee, 2011; Holroyd, Pakzad-
Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008; Potts, Martin, Burton, &
Montague, 2006; Warren & Holroyd, 2012). In other words,
the common perception that the feedback error-related neg-
ativity is elicited specifically by an error process is, in fact,
incorrect. Our emphasis on the reward properties rather than
the error properties of the difference wave is in keeping with
this recent literature.
Our results indicate that the impulsive behavior that
defines HDs is at least partly driven by overvaluation of
immediate rewards by a neural system responsible for
reinforcement learning and decision making. Abnormal
reward positivities have also been observed in other
populations characterized by impulsive behavior, namely
substance abusers (Baker et al., 2010, 2011) and problem
gamblers (Hewig et al., 2010). The reward positivity is
strongly correlated with ventral striatal activation, and it
has in fact been suggested to be generated by this subcorti-
cal brain area (Carlson, Foti, Mujica-Parodi, Harmon-Jones,
& Hajcak, 2011; Foti et al., 2011). Thus, whereas other
research has pointed to relatively decreased ventral striatal
activity to future rewards in HDs (Ballard & Knutson,
2009), our results reveal that the ventral striatum may in
fact overvalue future (as well as immediate) rewards in such
individuals. However, this apparent discrepancy is based on
a main effect of group that should be understood in the
context of an absence of statistical differences in reward
positivity amplitudes to future rewards between HDs and
LDs, and between either of these amplitudes and 0 μV, an
issue that invites further investigation.
More generally, the reward positivity has been said to
index the impact of reward prediction error signals carried
by the midbrain dopamine system on motor-related areas
within the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Holroyd &
Coles, 2002). These reward signals may be used by the
ACC specifically to learn the values of extended sequences
of behavior according to principles of hierarchical
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2013) 13:36–45 43
reinforcement learning (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012).
According to this view, the ACC is concerned with select-
ing, maintaining, and motivating the task itself rather than
the specifics of task execution. In the context of the hierar-
chical reinforcement learning account of ACC function,
variation in the size of the reward positivity may reflect
individual differences in participants’ motivation to perform
the task at hand. Our findings thus suggest that HDs may be
more motivated than LDs to work for monetary rewards,
irrespective of the time of arrival of those incentives.
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